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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
PROTECTION FOR NATIVE AMERICANS?
THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT OF 1990
I. INTRODUCTION
The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990' ("Act") aims to protect Native
American artists from unfair competition in the form of counterfeit goods pro-
duced domestically and abroad. The Act was originally enacted in 1935, and the
current Act is mainly a revision of the earlier law ("1935 Act").2
Given the legislative history of the Act, it is most likely a necessary piece of
legislation. However, as often is the case with federal or state legislation, prob-
lems have arisen. This has occurred mostly in the cases of museums and Native
American artists who have either chosen not to register with a legally recognized
Native American tribe or who have been unable to do so. For these enterprises
and individuals, it appears that there has been, or will be, some chilling effects
on their freedom of expression. However, to date there have been no legal ac-
tions challenging the constitutionality of the Act.
The background of the current Act is highly relevant and warrants an in-depth
discussion The Act itself is not very long, only seven sections, and is rather
straightforward, but analysis of each section will be useful.4 Finally, the 1990
Act has had many effects, some of which may provide the bases for future litiga-
tion.'
II. BACKGROUND
As stated above, the Act is more accurately described as amendments of the
1935 legislation.6 The very superficial legislative history of the law is that it was
enacted on August 27, 1935, was amended in a minor fashion on June 25, 1948,
then amended again in 1990 to provide us with the current Act. The 1948
1. 25 U.S.C. §§305-305e and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1158-1159 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
2. For descriptions of both versions of the law, see infra, section II.
3. See infra, section II.
4. See infra, section III.
5. See infra, section IV.
6. 25 U.S.C. §305 (1983).
1
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amendments repealed the old sections five and six 7 of the 1935 Act and relocat-
ed them to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1159, respectively. In 1990, entirely new
sections 305d and 305e were written, and existing sections (including sections
1158 and 1159) were amended.
A. THE 1935 ACT
The 1935 Act was enacted on August 27, 19358 and established the Indian
Arts and Crafts Board. Since that time, the Board has been responsible for pro-
moting the development of Indian arts and crafts, improving the economic condi-
tion of Native Americans, establishing and expanding marketing opportunities for
Native Americans, and aiding Native American tribes in preserving tribal cultural
activities.9 The Board was given the authority to create a trademark of authentici-
ty and to establish standards and regulation for the use of this trademark."0 The
1935 Act established criminal penalties for counterfeiting the trademark and for
misrepresenting (for the purpose of sale) Native American-produced goods,"
but civil actions were not authorized until the 1990 amendments." The criminal
penalties created by the 1935 Act for either counterfeiting the government trade-
mark or misrepresenting the goods as Native American-made were fines of up to
$2,000 and/or imprisonment of up to six months in jail."3 In addition, one found
guilty of counterfeiting the trademark could be enjoined from such further use."
The 1935 Act contained a "willful" standard to be found guilty of misrepresenta-
tion.S Enforcement of the 1935 Act was left solely to local district attorneys.'6
The 1935 Act created the structural aspects of the Board, which is comprised
of five commissioners appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. 7 The original
group of five commissioners served staggered term lengths, but their successors
each served a term of four years. 8 These commissioners served without com-
pensation, but were reimbursed for all actual expenses (such as travel and office
overhead) that the Board could certify as being properly related to the commis-
sioner's performance of his Board duties. 9
The Board was given a wide variety of powers, ranging from undertaking
market and technical research,"0 to making recommendations for loans to further
7. 25 U.S.C. §§305d and 305e.
8. Act of August 27, 1935, Ch. 748, 49 Stat. 891 (1935).
9. 25 U.S.C. §305a (1983); H.R. Rep. No. 400(11), 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
10. H.R. Rep. No. 400(11) at 5; Ch. 748, §2(g), 49 Stat. 891.
11. Id.
12. 25 U.S.C. §§305d and 305e.
13. Ch. 748, §§5 and 6, 49 Stat. 891.
14. Ch. 748, §5, 49 Stat. 891.
15. Ch. 748, §6, 49 Stat. 891.
16. Id.
17. Ch. 748, §1, 49 Stat. 891.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Ch. 748, §2(a) and (b), 49 Stat. 891.
[Vol. IV:231
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the production and sale of Native American products,2 to offering management
assistance,' to creating the government trademarks,' to negotiating and exe-
cuting any necessary contracts.24 The Board was also given the power to promul-
gate the necessary rules to allow it to perform its other listed powers; these rules
were to be submitted to the Secretary of the Interior for approval.' However,
the Board was specifically not authorized to "borrow or lend money or to deal in
Indian goods."' Finally, Treasury appropriations were authorized for execution
and administration of the Board's powers; any income derived by the Board was
to be placed in the Treasury to create a fund for necessary Board-authorized
expenditures.' These powers were given to the Board so it could carry out its
duty to "promote the economic welfare of the Indian tribes.., through the
development of Indian arts and crafts and the expansion of the market for the
products of Indian arts and craftsmanship."28
As is evidenced in the legislative history of the 1990 Act, the 1935 Act did
not have its desired effects. Hence, more than 50 years after the enactment of the
1935 Act, the 1990 Act was introduced to Congress.
B. THE 1990 ACT
Though the law had been around since 1935, little had been done in the way
of enforcement." The registration of the government-owned trademark under
the old law did not guarantee exclusive rights. Rather, it merely allowed the
owner to use the mark to distinguish his or her goods from those of others."
Registering trademarks was also cumbersome since the Board's office is in
Washington, D.C., far away from where most Native American goods are pro-
duced and sold. Finally, the old law did not provide any meaningful deterrent
against misrepresentation of imitation Indian arts and crafts.3 Testimony at the
time the 1990 Act was enacted showed there had been no prosecution under the
law for over fifty years, mainly because the law required "willfulness" and "in-
tent" for there to be a violation.32 Many states33 had enacted regulations regard-
21. Ch. 748, §2(f), 49 Stat. 891.
22. Ch. 748, §2(e), 49 Stat. 891.
23. Ch. 748, §2(g), 49 Stat. 891.
24. Ch. 748, §2(i), 49 Stat. 891.
25. Ch. 748, §3, 49 Stat. 891.
26. Ch. 748, §2, 49 Stat. 891.
27. Ch. 748, §4, 49 Stat. 891.
28. Ch. 748, §2, 49 Stat. 891.
29. H.R. Rep. No. 400(11).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The states which currently have state laws prohibiting the fraudulent sale of Native American
artwork are: ARIZ. REV. STAT. §44-1231 to §44-1231.04 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (provides for civil
penalties not to exceed $5000 and for injunctive relief); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17569-§ 17569.9
(West 1987 & Supp. 1991) (no penalties listed); COLO. REV. STAT. §12-44.5-101 to §12-44.5-108
(1990 & Supp. 1992) (provides for criminal penalties ranging from six months in prison and/or $500
3
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ing the sale of Native American arts and crafts,' but enforcement was often
hampered due to the ambiguity of the state laws, especially in regards to who
had the responsibility for enforcement.35 However, a section was deleted from
the bill which would have preempted state legislative actions in this area.'
A 1985 Commerce Department report to Congress estimated that the Native
American arts and crafts market had a value of $400 to $800 million annually."
The report also indicated that unmarked imported imitations of Native American
arts and crafts were siphoning off ten to twenty percent of the market for the
genuine artwork produced domestically." The Commerce Department also
found most of the counterfeit market was composed of jewelry production that
was underselling the genuine Zuni-, Hopi-, and Navajo-produced jewelry by up
to fifty percent.39 Supplies and samples were being sent to foreign countries
such as the Philippines and Mexico where they could be copied at a substantially
reduced cost.4" The samples were then duplicated and shipped back to the Unit-
ed States, passing through Customs by the use of peel-off tags indicating the
country of origin. The goods were then sold as Indian or American made, con-
centrating in major marketing areas4' for Native American arts and crafts and
fine to 24 months in prison and/or $5000 fine and for private remedy of actual damages plus costs of
suit including attorneys fees); MONT. CODE ANN. §30-14-601 to-§30-14-604 (1991) (provides for
criminal penalties of up to six months in prison and/or up to $500 fine); NEB. REv. STAT. §69-1801
to-§69-1808 (1990) (provides for $100 to $500 fine); N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-33-1 to §30-33-11
(Michie 1989 & Supp 1992) (provides for injunctive relief; for civil penalties of up to $500 fine per
violation; for criminal penalties which vary with the value of the property counterfeited, ranging from
$100 fine per violation per day to $5000 fine per violation per day and/or from up to 6 months in
prison to up to 18 months in prison; and for private remedies of actual damages and costs of suit,
including attorney fees, and treble damages if the violation was willful); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78 §71 -
§75 (1987 & Supp. 1992) (provides for fines of $25-$200 and/or 30-90 days in prison); S.D. CODI-
IED LAWS ANN. §37-7-1 to §37-7-2.1 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (provides for criminal penalties of $100
and/or 30 days in prison); TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §17.851-§17.853 (West 1987 & Supp.
1992) (provides for criminal penalties of up to $1500 and/or up to 180 days in prison).
34. For issues of possible federal preemption of the state laws, see Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Assn., _ U.S. _, _. 112 S.Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992) ("the ultimate task in any preemp-
tion case is to determine whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose of the
federal law as a whole"); English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 87 (1990) ("usually, mere
existence of a federal regulatory or enforcement scheme does not by itself imply preemption of a
state statute"); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) ("displacement of state
law will occur only where significant conflict exists between identifiable federal policy or interest and
operation of state law, or where application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of federal
legislation"); and Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299 (1988) ("even where Con-
gress does not entirely displace state regulation in a particular field, state law is preempted when it
actually conflicts with the federal law, and such conflict will be found when it is impossible to com-
ply with both the federal and state law or where the state law stands
as an obstacle to accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress").
35. H.R. Rep. No. 400(11) at 5.
36. 136 Cong. Rec. H8291, H8292; H.R. Rep. No. 400 (II) at 8.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. These areas are mainly Denver, Colorado; Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Phoenix. Arizona. 4
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usurping up to 50 percent of the Native American jewelry market.
The sponsors of the current law, which was enacted on November 29, 1990,
were Representatives Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) and (now Senator) Ben Nighthorse
Campbell (D-Colo.). 42 Debates in the House and the Senate were heard in Sep-
tember and October of 1990,43 though the Interior and Insular Affairs Commit-
tee held a field hearing on August 17, 1989 and considered the bill as early as
November, 1989.' The bill was considered by the Interior Committee in Febru-
ary, 1990, was amended, and then considered by the Judiciary Committee in
September, 1990.45 The general purposes of the Act were to expand the powers
of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board' and to promote the "Federal Indian policy
of economic self-sufficiency.
'47
To accomplish these goals the Act expands the Board's power by allowing
registration of trademarks for individuals and tribes in addition to the govern-
ment-owned trademark provided for in the 1935 Act.48 As before, registration is
to be free of charge.49 Furthermore, the Board is specifically authorized to pur-
sue and defend actions.' Finally, the Act amends the criminal provisions, clarify-
ing the procedures for prosecuting claims and increasing the penalties for coun-
terfeiting and for misrepresentation." The Act upgrades the criminal penalties
making them more consistent with existing penalties for comparable crimes
under federal law 2 and creating new civil penalties for misrepresentation.53
There are other ways in which the Act amends the 1935 version. At the discre-
tion of the Board, enforcement can be undertaken by the United States Attorney
General,' rather than by local district attorneys.55 This will allow the Board
and Native American tribes and individuals access to the more expansive re-
sources of the Federal government, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Attorney General's office, in enforcing the Act. Originally, the Act
would have allowed prosecution in civil actions by state attorneys general, but
this provision was stricken because it was believed inappropriate to have state
officials enforcing federal statutes.' In addition, the Act gives the Board the
power to pursue or defend any determinations made by the Patent and Trade-
H.R. Rep. No. 400(1) at 5.
42. H.R. Rep. No. 400(11) at 6.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id.
45. H.R. Rep. No. 400; 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6382.
46. H.R. Rep. No. 400(1) at 5.
47. 136 Cong. Rec. at H8292 (statement of Representative Rhodes of Arizona).
48. H.R. Rep. No. 400(1I) at 6.
49. Ch. 748, §2(g), 49 Stat. 891; 25 U.S.C. §305a(g)(3).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 7.
53. Id.
54. 25 U.S.C. §305e.
55. Ch. 748, §6, 49 Stat. 891.
56. H.R. Rep. No. 400(1I) at 8.
1994]
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mark Office.57
In light of the market abuses described above, much of the focus has been on
curbing the importation of foreign imitations. For example, a law5" requiring
permanent marking of country-of-origin on imported Indian-style jewelry. But
problems also existed in the domestic market. 9 Therefore, focus has begun to
shift to the domestic issue as well, through the introduction of the Act. The do-
mestic problem is similar to the problems of foreign counterfeiting: misrepresen-
tation of non-Native American artwork as genuine Native American artwork. The
difference is that these goods are produced in America by artists who claim to be
members of a Native American tribe.' The Act attempts to remedy domestic
problems by expanding Native American-owned marketing enterprises to more
directly benefit Native American tribes and individuals.6
C. RELATION TO THE LANHAM AcT
The Lanham Act,62 the general trademark law in America, makes provisions
for registration of certification marks. A certification mark, as defined by the
Lanham Act, is any word, name or symbol that is "used by a person other than
its owner, or which an owner has a bona fide intention to permit a person other
than its owner to use in commerce ... to certify regional or other origin, mate-
rial, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy ... or that the work or labor on the
goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organiza-
tion."63 In general, trademarks are intended to help the consumer identify the
source of a particular product and to protect the manufacturer from unfair trade
practices by competitors. However, an intended goal of certification marks is to
allow the maker of the product to signal to the consumer the product conforms
to the standards set by the organization named on the mark. In looking for a
particular certification mark, a consumer may be more interested in being assured
the product meets a particular baseline level of quality rather than whether the
product was made by a certain manufacturer.
The Board-, craft organization-, and tribe-owned trademarks provided for in
the Act are similar to certification marks in that the Act's trademarks are not to
aid in source-identification or to prevent consumer confusion between products.
Rather, like the Lanham Act's certification marks, the Act's trademarks are
merely a symbol of quality, genuineness, and that the maker of the product was
a member of a Native American tribe. The marks do not necessarily inform the
consumer of the specific source of the particular item, rather only that the item is
in fact a genuine Native American product and meets the standards that have
57. 25 U.S.C. §305a(g)(4).
58. This particular section of the Omnibus Trade Act, P.L.-100-418 (1988) is codified at 19
U.S.C. §1304 (Supp. 1992).
59. H.R. Rep. No. 400(11) at 6.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
63. Id. §§1 127.
[Vol. IV:231
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been set to qualify as such.
Additionally, there is some similarity between section four of the Act and the
Lanham Act's provision for false designation. The Lanham Act makes illegal any
"false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact or false or
misleading representation of fact which is likely to cause confusion or to cause
mistake or to deceive as to the affiliation ... or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his goods ... by another person."' Similarly, the basic goal of the
Act is to prevent individuals from passing off non-Native American goods as
genuine Native American goods, though this would clearly be illegal even with-
out the Act. The Act serves to particularize the offense to Native American
goods and to specify and define the rather hefty penalties for such activities.
III. PROVISIONS OF THE LAW
A section-by-section analysis of the law is the most useful way to approach
this statute. There are four areas provided for in the Act: definitions of terms
used, the powers of the Indian Arts and Craft Board, criminal penalties, and civil
penalties. Section one simply designates the act as the "Indian Arts and Crafts
Act of 1990."'
A. DEFINITIONS
Section four contains definitions of the Act's key terms. For the purposes of
this Act, the term "Indian" refers to any individual who is a member of a Native
American tribe or who is certified as a Native American artisan by a Native
American tribe.' The term "Indian tribe" refers to any Native American "tribe,
band, nation, Alaska Native village, or other organized group or community
which is recognized as eligible for the special ... services provided by the Unit-
ed States to Indians because of their status as Indians,"'67 or "any Indian group
that has been formally recognized as an Indian tribe by a State legislature or by
a State commission or similar organization legislatively vested with State tribal
recognition authority."' The term "Indian arts and crafts organization" refers to
"any legally established arts and crafts marketing organization composed of
members of Indian tribes."'69
B. POWERS OF THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTs BOARD
Section two establishes the various functions of the Board, including engaging
in technical research, offering assistance to different groups for the furtherance of
specific projects, and making recommendations to appropriate agencies for loans
64. Id. §§1125(a)(1).
65. 25 U.S.C. §305 el seq.
66. 18 U.S.C. §1159(c)(1) (1984 & Supp. 1992).
67. Id. §1 159(c)(3)(A).
68. Id. § 1159(c)(3)(B).
69. Id. §1 159(c)(4).
1994]
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to aid the production and sale of Native American goods." Most importantly,
this section gives the Board the power to create and register a trademark of
genuineness and quality for Native American products; ' the registration may be
on behalf of the Board, an individual Native American, a Native American tribe,
or Native American arts and crafts organization.72 The registration of the trade-
mark is always free.73 The Board also has the power to set regulations and
guidelines for the use of government-owned trademarks and to pursue or defend
any action or appeal in court regarding these trademarks."4 Provisions are also
made for the employment of officers and personnel as may be necessary to im-
plement the Act.75 This section also changes the way in which Board members
receive reimbursement. Rather than reimbursement for actual expenses as pro-
vided for in the 1935 Act, Commissioners are still to serve without compensa-
tion, but are to receive per diem payment (instead of subsistence and other ex-
penses) as set forth in Title 5, section 5703.76
Section three, a new section, permits the Board to receive complaints of viola-
tions of the Act and to refer the complaints of violations to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation for investigation.7 Upon receipt and review of the investigative
report, the Board may then recommend to the United States Attorney General
that criminal proceedings be commenced." The Board may also recommend
that the Secretary of the Interior refer the complaint to the Attorney General for
civil prosecution.79
Though not detailed in the Act itself, the Board does possess other varied
powers, as set out in the Code of Federal Regulations.' These powers range
from regulation of standards and trademarks for turquoise and silver products,81
to standards and trademarks for wool products,' to the certificates of genuine-
ness that are to accompany the general trademarks for any genuine Native Amer-
ican handicraft. 3
The Board's powers are very specific as indicated by the power given to it
regarding the trademarks which are the subject of the Act (and the certificates of
70. 25 U.S.C. §305a.
71. Id. §305a(g).
72. Id. §305a(g)(1).
73. 15 U.S.C. §Il13(b) (1983 & Supp. 1992).
74. 25 U.S.C. §305(g).
75. Id. §305a(g)(2).
76. Id. §305. The referenced section of Title 5 states, "An employee serving intermittently in the
Government service as an expert or consultant and paid on a daily when-actually-employed basis, or
serving without pay ... , may be allowed travel or transportation expenses, under this subchapter,
while away from his home or regular place of business and at the place of employment or service." 5
U.s.C. §5703 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
77. 25 U.S.C. §305d(a).
78. Id. §305d(a).
79. Id. §305d(b).
80. 25 C.F.R. §§301-310 (1992).
81. Id. §§301 and 304.
82. Id. §307.
83. Id. §308.
[Vol. IV:231
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genuineness that are to indicate the presence of such trademarks). Each Native
American individual or organization that registers a trademark must be given the
right by the Board to attach a certificate of genuineness to that trademark. 4 The
certificate declares the trademark is authorized by the Board and the seller of the
handicraft is a recognized Native American enterprise dealing in genuine
goods. 5 The general rationale behind this provision is to "ensure the widest
distribution of genuine Indian handicraft products, and to protect the various
enterprises organized by individual [or groups of] Indian craftsmen." 6
Additionally, there are certain conditions that must be met before an artisan
will be given the right to attach one of these certificates to the product being
sold." First, the enterprise must be selling only Native American-made genuine
handicraft products; these are defined as "objects produced by Indian craftsmen
with the help of only such devices as allow the manual skill of the maker to con-
dition the shape and design of each individual product."88 Second, the enterprise
must be entirely owned by an individual Native American or a group of Native
Americans." Third, the enterprise must agree to apply these certificates only on
products that meet the quality standards prescribed by the Board at the time the
certificate is attached to the product.' Finally, the enterprise must agree to get
the approval of the Board regarding the manner of producing the certificates.9
Of course, if an enterprise fails to meet these conditions after gaining the right to
use the certificate, the Board retains the right to revoke such privilege of attach-
ment.92
Section seven of the Act, another new section, authorizes recognized Native
American tribes to certify individuals who would not otherwise qualify as mem-
bers of the tribe as Native American artisans. However, the tribe may not impose
a fee for certifying the individual as a Native American artisan.93
C. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR MISREPRESENTATION
The penalties for violation of the Act are rather substantial, whether the penal-
ties imposed are civil or criminal. Section four states:
It is unlawful to offer or display for sale or sell any good, with or without a
Government trademark, in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced,
an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian tribe or Indian
arts and crafts organization, resident within the United States.'
84. Id. §308.2(a).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. §308.3.
88. Id. §308.3(a).
89. Id. §308.3(b).
90. Id. §308.3(c).
91. Id. §308.3(d).
92. Id. §308.4.
93. 25 U.S.C. §305.
94. 18 U.S.C. §159(a).
19941
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This section enumerates the criminal penalties for such "knowing" misrepresenta-
tion.9' The penalty for an individual first-time offender is a fine of not more
than $250,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than five years.' Subsequent
violations by an individual are to be punished by a fine of not more than
$1,000,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than fifteen years.97 The penalties
for a first-time offender other than an individual is a fine of not more than
$1,000,000.98 Subsequent violations by a person other than an individual are to
be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000,000. 9 "Person other than an in-
dividual" is currently undefined in the statute. The language "in a manner that
falsely suggests" was added into the Act to avoid any potential overbreadth de-
fense."° Additionally, this language parallels the false designation provision of
the Lanham Act.''
Section six of the Act relates to one who counterfeits any government trade-
mark used or devised by the Board. Penalties can be imposed upon one who
counterfeits or "colorably imitates" any such trademark;' one who affixes a
trademark without having the authorization to do so; 3 one who "knowingly,
willfully, and corruptly" affixes a copy, counterfeit or "colorable imitation" on
any product, label, sign, package, or wrapper intended for sale; ° or one who
knowingly makes a false statement in order to obtain the use of such trade-
mark. 105
The penalties imposed under section six are similar to the criminal penalties
imposed under section four for misrepresentation. The monetary fines and sen-
tencing structure are the same as those in section four. The difference is that this
section provides that the offender shall be enjoined from any further carrying on
the act(s) complained of."°
D. CIVIL PENALTIES FOR MISREPRESENTATION
Section five, another new section, establishes the civil penalties for the mis-
representation of Native American produced goods and allows standing to sue for
95. Id. §1159(b).
96. Id. §1159(b)(1).
97. Id. §1159(b)(2).
98. Id. §1159(b)(1).
99. Id. §1159(b)(2).
100. H.R. Rep. No. 400(I) at 11.
101. Id. The relevant portion of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 125(a)(1), refers to "false designa-
tion of origin, false or misleading description of fact or false or misleading representation of fact
which is likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or to deceive as to the affiliation ... or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his goods ... by another person."
102. 18 U.S.C. §1158.
103. Id. §1158.
104. Id. §1158.
105. Id. §1158.
106. Id. § 1158(3).
[Vol. IV:231
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such violations. 7 Civil actions may be brought by the United States Attorney
General upon request of the Secretary of the Interior on behalf of a Native
American who is a member of a tribe or on behalf of a Native American tribe or
Native American arts and crafts organization." A civil suit may also be
brought by a Native American tribe on its own behalf or on the behalf of a Na-
tive American arts and crafts organization" or by any Native American ag-
grieved by the prohibited conduct."'
Any person with the proper standing to sue for a violation of the Act may
obtain injunctive or other equitable relief." He may also recover the greater of
treble damages" 2 or, in the case of each aggrieved individual Native American,
Native American tribe, or Native American arts and crafts organization, not less
than $1,000 for each day on which the display/offer for sale or sale contin-
ues."3 In addition to the above relief, section five also grants the court the
power to award punitive damages, the costs of suit, and reasonable attorney's
fees."4 All damages recovered under section five are to be paid to the indi-
vidual Native American, Native American tribe or Native American arts and
crafts organization, with only two exceptions." 5 First, in the situation where the
Attorney General brings the suit, he may deduct a sum from the amount recov-
ered as reimbursement for the costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees." 6
Second, in the situations where the tribe brings suit on behalf of itself or on
behalf of an arts and crafts organization or where the aggrieved individual brings
suit, the amount recovered for the costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees
may be deducted from the amount awarded as the choice between treble damag-
es or not less than $1,000 per day of damage noted above."'
IV. IMPACT
As is the case with nearly every piece of legislation enacted in the United
States, there are effects that result from the Act. Some are positive, and some are
negative, depending on one's point of view. The major effects of the Act have
been the problems in determining Native American status and the fears of liabili-
ty for only displaying the artwork.
107. 25 U.S.C. §305e.
108. Id. §305e(c)(1)(A).
109. Id. §305e(c)(1)(B).
110. Id. §305e(c)(1)(B).
111. Id. §305e(a)(1).
112. Id. §305e(a)(2)(A).
113. Id. §305e(a)(2)(B).
114. Id. §305e(b).
115. Id. §305e(c)(2).
116. Id. §305e(c)(2)(A).
117. Id. §305e(c)(2)(B).
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A. TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP AND NATIVE AMERICAN STATUS
The Act was intended to keep cheap imitations of Native American art out of
the market, and it will have that effect by making it a crime to represent the
lower-priced imitation artwork as genuine Native American artwork. The Act has
been described as "truth-in-advertising" legislation. While it will not prevent an
artist from displaying and selling his work, the Act does prevent him from de-
scribing his art as Native American where it is not."8 A problem that has re-
cently arisen takes the form of artists of Native American ancestry who are not
formally affiliated with a tribe. These artists have claimed the Act is posing seri-
ous harm to their livelihoods." 9
Though the Act defines "Indian" as one who is a formally enrolled tribe
member or someone whom the tribe has certified as a Native American art-
ist,'20 even this latter provision has not helped some artists. Additionally, some
artists who are members of tribes object to having to prove membership in order
to sell their work.' Many Native Americans resent the Act's attempt to legis-
late the tribal issue of who is a real Native American and who is not." Others,
however, feel the Act serves as an effective way to preserve the integrity of the
various Native American cultures."z
For example, Andrew Alvarez, an artist in Long Beach, California, is part
Native American and part Mexican.24 He was recently excluded from exhibit-
ing his work at a crafts fair because he could not prove membership in a
tribe." He is in the process of obtaining membership in the Navajo tribe, but
obtaining such membership is not like registering to vote or getting a library
card. Rules vary from tribe to tribe, but the process generally takes a great many
months." For a Native American not born and raised on an Indian reservation,
obtaining membership can be an ordeal. Until he is able to obtain such member-
ship, he must advertise his jewelry as Indian-style or Southwestern-style.'27
Many urban Native Americans have been excluded from art fairs, crafts shows
and other expositions simply because they had no formal affiliation with a Native
American tribe.'28 There is much warranted concern that these urban Native
Americans will have greater difficulty in proving tribal affiliations than will other
Native Americans."
118. Stephanie Goldberg, Made in America, 78 A.B.A.J. 32 (Apr. 1992).
119. Id.
120. 25 U.S.C. §305e(d)(1).
121. Michelle Quinn, Ethnic Litmus Test a Problem for American Indian Artists, L.A. TIMES, June
18, 1992, at Fl, col. 2.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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The first hurdle is determining "What is a tribe?" because Native American
status is defined in terms of tribal membership. The Act considers only those
tribes which are registered with either an appropriate federal or state agency to
be legal Native American Tribes."3 A problem arises in that some Native
American organizations never registered with either the federal or state govern-
ment out of fear and protest over the establishment of the reservations. For ex-
ample, California has 100 recognized tribes, but as of 1990, only 48,000 of the
242,164 who said they were Native American were officially registered with a
recognized tribe.'
The matter then becomes even more complex because of the differing stan-
dards each tribe may set for membership. Some tribes require a certain percent-
age of Native American blood while others recognize only those whose mothers
or fathers are members of the tribe.' In the general realm of all federal laws,
the answer to "Who is a Native American?" often depends on the context of the
federal law, and the racially-based answer may be different than the legally-
based one.' Federal laws define "Indian" in different ways.'" But in the ab-
sence of a definition, courts generally use a two part test. 5 First, the individu-
al must have some Native American blood, and second, the individual must be
recognized as Native American by the Native American community."
This second part is where many of the problems arise because of the differing
standards for each tribe. Though most tribes require that the person have at least
one-fourth Native American blood to become a member,'37 other tribes require
five-eighths,'38  one-half, 9  one-sixteenth,140 or one-thirtysecond. 4' A few
tribes have still other requirements such as residence on the reservation for a
certain period of time or filing the enrollment application within a few years of
the applicant's birth. 4 1 Some tribes will only allow a child to become a mem-
ber if his father is a member.43 In one situation a tribe refused to enroll chil-
dren whose mother was a full-blooded tribal member, but whose father did not
130. 25 U.S.C. §305e(d)(3)(A) and (B).
131. Quinn, supra note 121.
132. Id.
133. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIAN TRIBES 12 (ACLU 1992).
134. Even though one who is an accepted member of a particular tribe might not necessarily be
considered Native American for every federal purpose, PEVAR, supra note 133, at 13. this is not an
issue in the Act's context. This is so because the Act considers one to be a Native American as long
as he is a member of a recognized Native American tribe. 18 U.S.C. §1 159(C)(1) and (3). Addition-
ally, section seven of the Act specifically includes any person who is certified by the tribe as an
artisan, even if that person would not normally qualify for membership in that tribe.
135. PEVAR, supra note 133, at 12.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 13.
138. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 8 (West 1981).
139. PEVAR, supra note 133, at 13.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 86.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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have any tribal blood." Still other tribes use matriarchal descent as an added
requirement.'45 Such extra demands upon membership, though they might be
considered discriminatory, have been upheld by the Supreme Court as being
within tribal power.'46
Native American artists who are unable to display their artwork for lack of
proof of membership in recognized tribes would have the most to gain in chal-
lenging the Act. Overturning the Act would allow these artists access to the
publicity and income that can be obtained through art exhibitions and fairs. How-
ever, at least one United States Attorney feels the Act is constitutional.'47 This
is likely to be the case in light of earlier Supreme Court rulings. The Supreme
Court has previously held that tribal membership is solely a tribal concern and
that since Native Americans are a political, as opposed to racial group, they can
be singled out for different treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment." 8 This
was the holding of Morton v. Mancari49 where hiring preferences were upheld
because the classification was directed only at "members of federally recognized
tribes" and was therefore a political, rather than racial, classification.'" Further-
more, since the preference was more akin to an employment criterion than an
invidious racial classification, rational basis review was used.' This means
that as long as the special treatment can be rationally linked to "Congress'
unique obligation toward the Indian,"'52 legislative judgments will not be
disturbed.'53 The Court felt the power of Congress to legislate on behalf of
federally recognized Native American tribes came from the "unique" legal status
of Native American tribes under federal law through a history of treaties and the
assumption of a "guardian-ward status."'' The Court noted that if all legisla-
tion singling out Native Americans for a certain special treatment were deemed
invidious racial discrimination, all of Title 25 of the U.S. Code would be wiped
out and the "commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeop-
ardized."' 5
5
In the situation created by the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, the differ-
entiation is also based on membership in recognized tribes. Those who are regis-
tered can advertise their art as Native American art; those who are not registered,
144. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
145. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 12 (Deloria, Jr., ed., University of
Oklahoma Press 1985).
146. Id.
147. Goldberg, supra note 118. (Statement by Assistant United States Attorney Herb Becker of
Albuquerque, N.M.).
148. Id.
149. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
150. Peter Tasso, Greywater v. Joshua and Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-member Indians, 75 IOWA
L. REv. 685, 760 (1990).
151. Morton, 417 U.S. 535.
152. Id. at 556.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 551.
155. Id. at 552.
[Vol. IV:231
14
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol4/iss2/4
INDIAN ARTS & CRAFTS ACT
cannot." As such, the Act must only be rationally or reasonably related to gov-
ernmental ends that are legitimate or valid. The governmental ends of protecting
Native American culture and preserving the market for Native American goods
from the effects of counterfeiters, foreign competitors and misrepresentation are
arguably greater than merely "legitimate" or "valid." The means used to achieve
this goal appear to be at least reasonably and rationally related. The requirements
and definitions of the Act seem to be the least restrictive method to achieve the
purpose of the Act. To set the broader guidelines than those currently existing
under the Act would most likely diminish the effects of the law. Legislative
determinations that a certain sector, namely the Native American arts and crafts
market, needed certain prQtection for its preservation will therefore probably not
be tampered with by the courts.
It is unfortunate that many genuine Native American artists may be excluded
from fairs or expositions, but this may be necessary to protect other artists from
the ill-effects of foreign undercutting and domestic misrepresentation. Further, a
non-member Native American still has the option of registering with the tribe of
his ancestry. Though this can be an arduous process with complex regulations,
matters of tribal membership is an area into which the federal and state govern-
ments do not have the authority to intrude.'57 Additionally, an artist has the
second option of becoming certified as a Native American artisan by a Native
American tribe. The rules on this, too, may vary from tribe to tribe, but tribes
are prohibited from charging a fee for this certification. 58
B. DISPLAY OF NATIVE AMERICAN ART
Another problem has cropped up not in the context of the sale of Native
American art, but rather in the display of Native American art, such as in a
museum. Though the Act was written to apply to art for sale only, many muse-
ums have been reluctant to display artwork without proof of tribal member-
ship.'59 As a result of the Act, museum curators have begun requiring proof of
membership in a Native American tribe before the artist's works will be shown
in the museum."6 Some exhibitions in western and southwestern states have
voluntarily shut down because the museums are afraid of losing their tax-exempt
status."' A more tangible fear is that of the stiff penalties imposed upon insti-
tutions by the Act, up to $1 million for a first time violation, and up to $5 mil-
lion for any subsequent violations. By the wording of the law, these fines
would not apply to museums since they are only displaying the artwork; howev-
er, museums have been afraid that the law will be applied to them and they will
156. 25 U.S.C. §305e.
157. Tasso, supra note 150, at 691.
158. 25 U.S.C. §305 et seq.
159. Quinn. supra note 121.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 18 U.S.C. §1158(1) and (2).
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be assessed the fines. Museums have closed art shows, even after the show had
been on display for a while, because the artist could not prove registration with a
tribe. 63
It is clear Congress, at least up to this point in time, did not intend the Act to
apply to museums. Especially since the wording of the Act clearly states (and
stated in 1935, as well), "[iut is unlawful to offer or display for sale or sell any
good .... . 64 There is no reference to display for the sake of observation only.
But many museum boards of directors have decided to self-regulate and set
standards to avoid the not inconsequential harm that could result if it was ever
found in violation.'65
This may have been an unintended side-effect, but it is nonetheless signifi-
cant. It would seem that in light of the economic objectives of the Act, museums
should be exempted as long as the museum does not sell any of the artwork it
displays. If there is no sale involved, the consumer is not at risk of purchasing
Native American artwork that is not really Native American, and the Native
American artwork market is not in danger of losing revenue to foreign counter-
feits. When there is no sale involved, the governmental ends lose their vitality.
But due to museum self-censorship, the Act may be having a chilling effect on
the First Amendment freedom of expression of those artists whose artwork is not
for sale, but only for display. The freedom of speech has been interpreted to
include purely artistic expression, as long as the art is not obscene in the legal
sense, even in cases of pornographic or otherwise offensive artwork." The Su-
preme Court has stated in dicta, "[t]he actor on stage or screen, the artist whose
creation is in oil or clay or marble ... are beneficiaries of freedom of expres-
sion." 67 As the artworks hanging in museums are generally not for sale, the
commercial speech exception (allowing greater regulation of commercial speech)
set forth in the Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission"' line of
cases would not apply.'69 It is true that a museum may buy the artwork from
the artist in order to display it and therein would lie the sale. 7' However, when
163. Quinn, supra note 121.
164. 18 U.S.C. §1159(a).
165. 25 U.S.C. §305 et seq.
166. Piarowski v. Illinois Community College District 515, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. den., 474 U.S. 1007 (1985); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
167. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 (1961), reh'g den., 368 U.S. 869 (1961).
168. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
169. Id. at 562 (commercial speech is "speech proposing a commercial transaction"). However,
there have been instances where speech that was not explicitly for the purpose of selling an item has
nonetheless been deemed regulatable under the commercial speech doctrine. See, e.g., Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (informational material regarding prophylactics and
venereal disease considered commercial speech). The difference between those situations and the
artwork hanging in a museum is that though the informational material may look like informational
material, one would be hard pressed to argue that the advertiser was distributing the material for
solely altruistic reasons. In the case of a museum hanging a painting on a wall, there is no product
being described, nor is a sale of that painting even being contemplated.
170. It is true that many museums do have some sort of "museum shop" where jewelry and other
types of artwork and crafts are sold. However, in that case, the Act would clearly apply, since those
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one is dealing with a (presumptively) experienced curator, it does not seem as
necessary to protect him from purchasing fraudulent goods.
The other side of this equation is that even though the "consumer" of a muse-
um is not purchasing the artwork in the museum, there is still the potential for
misleading the average visitor to a museum or exhibition. One who visits a mu-
seum expects that the artwork he sees there will be accurately described by the
cards that usually accompany the pieces of art. It is fair to say that one visiting a
museum has the right to be presented with accurate descriptions of the artwork.
This would certainly be so in the case of a museum that charged admission,
since the visitor is paying for the privilege of viewing genuine artwork. Howev-
er, because of the purported role of museums, to educate its visitors and expose
them to a variety of experiences not usually accessible to the average person, this
right would apply to free, public museums as well. If the artist is described as
Native American, the visitor will believe this, relying on the curator's expertise.
If a curator does not have proof of the artist's tribal membership, he or she could
be unknowingly misleading the public. Admittedly, the work is still "genuine" if
the artist is a non-affiliated Native American since tribal affiliation is arguably
not the only mark of a "true" Native American. But in order to guarantee that
"genuineness" it may be necessary to utilize the tribes' standards and limit dis-
plays to those Native Americans who can establish their tribal affiliation. And in
this respect, it may be necessary for curators to limit the displays to Native
American tribe members.
However, the bottom line may turn out to be the fact that the statute only re-
fers to goods being displayed for sale.'7 As a museum does not fit this de-
scription, it is regrettable that some are voluntarily placing limits on cultural
expression, even before Congress has expressed the intent to apply the statute to
non-commercial displays. It seems logical that museum curators would have
greater access than the general public to methods of ensuring the authenticity of
artwork before it is purchased and hung on the wall for display.
V. CONCLUSION
The rationales behind the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 are valid. It has
become necessary to prevent foreign imitations from siphoning revenues away
from a legitimate market for Native American culture and to prevent domesti-
cally-produced goods from being misrepresented as Native American. The twin
aims are to maintain the integrity of the Native American artwork market and to
protect the consumer from purchasing goods which are fraudulently advertised as
Native American.
However, the Act seems to be flawed. Some Native American artists are
goods would then be FOR SALE. 18 U.S.C. §1159(a). The Act makes provisions for fraudulent sale by
"persons other than an individual," 25 U.S.C. §305 et seq., and appears that a museum shop would fit
that category. The problems discussed in this article arise only in the case of artwork that is hanging
on the wall for DISPLAY ONLY, as differentiated from the case of museum shops.
171. 25 U.S.C. §305 et seq.
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suffering simply because they have chosen not to register with a recognized
Native American tribe, or have been unable to do so. The other flaw is the chill-
ing effect the Act has already had on museums, which have closed their doors in
fear of sanctions for displaying artwork lacking proof it was created by legal
Native Americans. It is possible the Act only needs minor fine tuning, and it is
possible this may happen. Until then, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 will
stand as written.
Deborah J. Spector
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